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Article 
Errors and Misconceptions in the 2015 
Department Of Defense Law of War Manual 
Jordan J. Paust 
Introduction 
This Article focuses primarily on several errors and 
manifest misconceptions contained in portions of Part I of the 
2015 Department of Defense Law of War Manual (the “2015 
Manual” or the “Manual”).1 These are related to the unavoidable 
duty of all members of the Executive branch, including members 
of the armed forces, to faithfully execute the law; the authority 
of the Executive to execute treaties; the relationship between the 
laws of war and other forms of international law applicable 
during armed conflict; the applicability and reach of human 
rights law during armed conflict; and the nature, reach, and 
content of customary international law. This Article also 
addresses certain other errors and concerns with respect to the 
nature of war crimes, compensation, targetable civilians, 
military necessity, the test regarding weapons of a nature to 
cause unnecessary suffering, dum-dum bullets, herbicides, 
destruction of food and water, justified force in the context of 
Kosovo, the proper test for legitimate self-defense, and the 
nature of non-international armed conflicts. 
Importantly, with respect to manifest errors and 
misconceptions, it would be a grave breach of a lawyer’s 
professional responsibilities to base legal advice on manifestly 
erroneous statements of law. If manifestly in error, the 
appearance of such statements in a DOD Manual affords no 
 
  Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston; 
former member of the Faculty of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s 
School, International Law Division (1969–2003). 
 1. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL (2015) 
[hereinafter DOD MANUAL]. Not all errors or concerns are addressed in this 
Article. 
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ethical2 or legal3 excuse. If the lawyer is in uniform, her duty to 
the law is even stronger4 and her professional leadership will 
require opposition to misstatements of law. 
 
 2. See Jose Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175, 
215–21 (2006); Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture 
Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 455 (2005); Marjorie Cohn, Advising 
Clients to Commit War Crimes with Impunity: An Unethical Practice, 10 
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 249 (2011); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Tale of Two 
Judges: A Judge Advocate’s Reflections on Judge Gonzales’s Apologia, 42 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 893, 897–98 (2010) (noting that government lawyers should not 
merely take a “legalistic view of a practitioner’s responsibilities” or be “simply 
agents of the executive branch”); George C. Harris, The Rule of Law and the 
War on Terror: The Professional Responsibilities of Executive Branch Lawyers 
in the Wake of 9/11, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 409, 431–41 (2005); Milan 
Markovic, Advising Clients After Critical Legal Studies and the Torture Memos, 
114 W. VA. L. REV. 109 (2011); Keith A. Petty, Professional Responsibility 
Compliance and National Security Attorneys: Adopting the Normative 
Framework of Internalized Legal Ethics, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1563 (2011); Jesselyn 
Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of the Government Advisor in the War 
on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2006); Michael P. Scharf, The Torture 
Lawyers, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 389 (2010); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal 
Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005); 
Philip Zelikow, Codes of Conduct for a Twilight War, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2012); 
see also DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 2, § 1.1.2 (“This manual is not a 
substitute for the critical practice of law. As specific legal issues arise, legal 
advisers should consider relevant legal and policy materials . . . and should 
apply the law to the specific factual circumstances.”). Clearly, it would be 
unethical for Department of Defense (“DOD”) or military lawyers to act like 
automatons or rely on manifest error proffered previously by a lawyer in the 
White House, NSA, or Department of State. 
 3. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 32(2), opened 
for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 1002 (entered into force July 1, 2002) 
[hereinafter Rome Statute] (“A mistake of law . . . shall not be a ground for 
excluding criminal responsibility . . . [m]ay, however be a ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility if it negates the mental element required by such a 
crime . . . .”); id. art 33(1)(c) (stating that a manifestly unlawful order shall not 
relieve a person of criminal responsibility); UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE 
MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 443, § 16.43 (2004) [hereinafter UK 
MANUAL] (“Ignorance of the law is no excuse . . . .”); GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 515–16 (2012) 
(summarizing that illegal orders are no defense); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT 244–45 (2004) (explaining that mistake of law and ignorance of the 
law are not an excuse but may negate a particular mental element required, but 
a mental element “cannot be negated if the illegality of the war crime is obvious 
to any reasonable man.”); id. at 250–51 (emphasizing that manifestly unlawful 
orders are not a defense); JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 122–35 (4th ed. 2013) (explaining that superior orders or authorizations 
that are manifestly or obviously unlawful provide no defense with respect to 
criminal conduct); see also DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1058, § 18.3.2 
(“[M]ust refuse to comply with clearly illegal orders . . . “). 
 4. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882); DIANE H. MAZUR, A 
MORE PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE CONSTITUTION CAN MAKE OUR MILITARY 
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I. MANIFEST ERRORS AND RECOGNIZABLE 
MISCONCEPTIONS 
A. ALL MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ARE BOUND BY 
THE LAWS OF WAR 
One of the most egregious and troubling manifest errors in 
the 2015 Manual is the bald assertion that “[t]he customary law 
of war is part of U.S. law insofar as it is not inconsistent with . . . 
a controlling executive . . . act.”5 This statement is patently false, 
seriously threatening to the rule of law, and dangerously 
inattentive to the unavoidable constitutionally-based duty of the 
President of the United States and all members of the Executive 
branch faithfully to execute the laws,6 which famously include 
customary international laws of war.7 As noted in a prior 
writing, with respect to unanimous recognition by the judiciary 
of the president’s express and unavoidable constitutional duty to 
faithfully execute the laws of war, 
In view of such a constitutionally-based mandate and 
limitation on presidential power, there has been a unanimous 
and unswerving recognition by Founders, Framers, and the 
 
STRONGER 113–15 (2010) (stressing that military personnel have a duty to the 
Constitution and the country, not merely to a particular president); see also 
Dunlap, Jr., supra note 2. 
 5. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 39, § 1.10.2.2. 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall . . . take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed . . . .”). 
 7. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the 
Founders, Framers, and Early Judiciary Concerning the Binding Nature of the 
Customary Law of Nations, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 205, 240–45 n.135 
(2008) [hereinafter Paust, In Their Own Words] (addressing fourteen U.S. 
Supreme Court cases, four other cases when future Supreme Court Justices 
were on circuit [United States v. American Gold Coin, 24 F. Cas. 780, 782 
(C.C.D. Mo. 1868) (No. 14,439) (Miller, J., on circuit); Elgee’s Adm’r v. Lovell, 8 
F. Cas. 449, 454 (C.C.D. Mo. 1865) (No. 4,344) (Miller, J., on circuit); Dias v. The 
Revenge, 7 F. Cas. 637, 639 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 3,877) (Washington, J., on 
circuit); The Joseph, 13 F. Cas. 1126, 1130–31 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 7,533) 
(Story, J., on circuit) (stating that he “cannot yield to this construction” that the 
President can “abridge the general rights of capture” under the laws of 
nations)], and other cases, opinions, and materials on point, including a famous 
Opinion of the Attorney General during the Civil War, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 
299–300 (1865)); see also United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1229 
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (Paterson, J., on circuit) (explaining that the Neutrality Act 
“is declaratory of the law of nations” and the President is bound to “take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.”); Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1102 
(C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (Jay, C.J.) (“[T]he laws of nations . . . are those laws by which 
civilized nations are bound to regulate their conduct . . . .”). 
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federal and state judiciary that during an armed conflict to 
which the laws of war apply, the President, despite whatever 
competence the Commander in Chief power provides, and all 
persons within the executive branch are bound by the laws of 
war.8 
The president is not above the law and has no authority to 
violate or control the law. As the Supreme Court emphasized 
more generally with respect to unlawful executive conduct just 
after and in connection with the United States Civil War, 
No man in this country is so high that he is above the 
law . . . All the officers of the government, from the 
highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are 
bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our 
system of government, and every man who by accepting 
office . . . is only the more strongly bound to submit to 
that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it 
imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it 
gives.9 
The 2015 Manual provides only one citation in alleged 
support of its manifestly unconstitutional and dangerous error,10 
namely, a partial quotation of two sentences from the 1900 
Supreme Court opinion in The Paquete Habana.11 In complete 
contrast to the Manual’s assertion, the Supreme Court famously 
ruled that executive claims regarding the content of customary 
laws of war were not controlling, that executive conduct against 
enemy aliens abroad during war was in violation of the laws of 
 
 8. Paust, In Their Own Words, supra note 7, at 240. 
 9. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220; see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (“The 
United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority 
have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations 
imposed by the Constitution.”); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–21 
(1866) (explaining that there are no powers ex necessitate outside the 
Constitution and its reach); United States v. Tiede, Crim. Case No. 78-001A, 86 
F.R.D. 227, 242 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin Mar. 14, 1979) (“[T]here has never been a 
time when United States authorities exercised governmental powers in any 
geographical area – whether at war or in times of peace – without regard for 
their own Constitution.”), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 179, 188, 191–92 (1980). 
 10. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 39 n.178. 
 11. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The DOD Manual 
misquotes the case, as the first sentence actually states: “International law is 
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of 
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon 
it are duly presented for their determination.” Id. (emphasis added). 
2017] ERRORS AND MISCONCEPTIONS 307 
war, and that appropriate compensation was required.12 What 
the 2015 Manual impliedly supports is one of the false claims 
proffered by President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick 
Cheney, and their complicit entourage in an infamous effort to 
facilitate a program of systematic and widespread serial 
criminality by claiming that the president and others in the 
Executive branch were not bound by the laws of war and—in 
serious subversion of the United States Constitution—that they 
were above the law.13 
The same erroneous sentence in the 2015 Manual sets forth 
a manifestly compounded error when alleging that “[t]he 
customary law of war is part of U.S. law insofar as it is not 
inconsistent with any treaty to which the United States is a 
Party . . . .”14 There is no known Supreme Court or other federal 
court decision holding that treaties necessarily trump 
inconsistent customary international law. On the contrary, it is 
well known that the opposite occurs when customary 
 
 12. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453 (1903) (explaining that 
Justice Holmes reaffirmed the earlier ruling and affirmed compensation that 
was owed); id. at 698 (“[L]aw of war . . . .”), 700, 708 (“[B]y the general consent 
of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty or 
other public act, it is an established rule of international law . . . .This rule of 
international law is one which prize courts, administering the law of nations, 
are bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to, [even] in the absence 
of any treaty or other public act . . . .”), 714 (“[I]t is the duty of this court . . . 
administering the law of nations, to declare and adjudge that the capture was 
unlawful . . . .”) (1900) (alteration in original); Jordan J. Paust, Paquete and the 
President: Rediscovering the Brief for the United States, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 981 
(1994) (providing full documentation of actual claims, which never involved a 
claim to violate the laws of war; the meaning of several sentences in Justice 
Gray’s opinion, similar phrases in an earlier opinion of Justice Gray, and their 
relation to judicial responsibility to identify and clarify the content of customary 
international law, and the holding). Concerning the primacy of judicial power 
to identify, clarify, and apply international law, especially with respect to 
rights, duties, status, and competencies during war, see also Jordan J. Paust, 
Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without 
Trial, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 517–25 (2003) [hereinafter Paust, Judicial 
Power]. 
 13. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR (2007); 
Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding 
Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to 
Unchecked Executive Power, 2 UTAH L. REV. 345, 345–73 (2007); Jordan J. 
Paust, The Bush-Cheney Legacy: Serial Torture and Forced Disappearance in 
Manifest Violation of Global Human Rights Law, 18 BARRY L. REV. 61, 67 (2012) 
[hereinafter Paust, Serial Criminality]; Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and 
Authorizations to Violate International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 
856–61 (2005). 
 14. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 39, § 1.10.2.2. 
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international law achieves the peremptory status of jus cogens.15 
Additionally, the Manual’s sweeping reference to “any treaty” 
would allegedly set a primacy for any bilateral treaty over 
customary international law, an illogical result that has no 
known support in international or domestic United States law. 
The same sentence in the Manual alludes to the possibility 
that an inconsistent legislative act would be controlling within 
the United States domestic legal process.16 However, several 
opinions of Supreme Court justices have recognized that 
customary international law has primacy, including primacy 
over the laws of war. At least twelve cases that affirm the 
primacy of customary international law are based on opinions of 
Supreme Court justices (which must necessarily be 
determinative), and cases affirming the primacy of customary 
international law outnumber those lower court opinions stating 
that domestic legislation prevails.17 Importantly, predominant 
 
 15. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 53, 64, opened 
for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; Human 
Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24, General Comment on Issues Relating 
to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the 
Optional Protocols, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 2, 1994); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 cmts. a, n (AM. LAW INST. 1987); JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 3–4, 61–63 (3d ed. 2009). Jus 
cogens norms are peremptory norms of universally applicable customary 
international law. Examples of rights, duties, and prohibitions jus cogens have 
been identified. 
 16. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 39, § 1.10.2.2. 
 17. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 108–15 (2d ed. 2003); Paust, In Their Own Words, supra note 
7, at 217–30. The thirteen opinions of Supreme Court Justices are in Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 261 (1984) 
(concluding that although political branches may terminate a treaty, power 
“delegated by Congress to the Executive . . . [,]” presumably by statute, and such 
a Congress-Executive “arrangement” must not be “exercised in a manner 
inconsistent with . . . international law”); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187 
(1871) (“Undoubtedly, no single nation can change the law of the sea. That law 
is of universal obligation, and no statute of one or two nations can create 
obligations for the world.”); Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331, 354–55 
(1871) (Field, J., dissenting); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 316 
(1870) (Field, J., dissenting); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 537, 539–
40 (1867) (explaining that a federal statute of limitations contained no exception 
regarding suspended claims during war, but “principles of international law” 
and the customary “law of nations” required a de facto exception because “the 
operation of the statute of limitation is also suspended . . . by the existence of 
the war and the law of nations “); Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 436–
37 (1838) (explaining that obligations of the U.S. “were regulated by the law of 
nations” and a private right to property protected thereunder is “inviolable”); 
United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 641–42 (1818) (“[C]ongress 
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views of the Founders and Framers,18 Supreme Court opinions,19 
and a famous opinion of the Attorney General during the Civil 
 
cannot make that piracy which is not piracy by the law of nations, in order to 
give jurisdiction to its own courts . . . .”); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress can never be construed 
to violate . . . rights . . . [under the customary law of nations] further than is 
warranted by the law of nations . . . .”); Dole v. New England Mutual Marine 
Ins. Co., 7 F. Cas. 837, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1864) (No. 3,966) (Clifford, J., on 
circuit) (stating that the legislative authority of a country may doubtless 
enlarge the definition of piracy, but, implicitly, must not “diminish” the 
prohibition under customary law); United States v. Darnaud, 25 F. Cas. 754, 
759–60 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 14,918) (Grier, J., on circuit) (recognizing that 
if Congress “were to call upon courts of justice to extend the jurisdiction of the 
United States beyond the limits . . . [set by the “law of nations”], it would be the 
duty of courts of justice to decline”); United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 
F. Cas. 832, 847–51 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (Story, J., on circuit) 
(recognizing “an offence against the universal law of society” and that “no nation 
can rightfully permit its subjects to carry it on, or exempt them . . . [and] no 
nation can privilege itself to commit a crime against the law of nations”); JAMES 
WILSON, A CHARGE DELIVERED TO THE GRAND JURY IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA (1791) (emphasizing that 
the customary law of nations cannot be altered or abrogated by domestic law), 
reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 803, 813–14 (Robert G. McCloskey 
ed., 1967); see also Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’r, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 82–84 (1795) 
(quoting a resolution of the Continental Congress of March 6, 1779, which had 
claimed a supreme power [as opposed to that of the states] “of executing the law 
of nations” to assure that the “legality” of any action taken was, since it “must 
be, determined by the law of nations” adding that “the law of nations [must] . . . 
be most strictly observed”); Paust, In Their Own Words, supra note 7, at 217 
n.34. 
 18. See, e.g., Paust, In Their Own Words, supra note 7, at 217–21 
(addressing views of Addison, Allen, Chase, Duponceau, Gallatin, Iredell, Jay, 
Jefferson, Johnson, Kent, Livingston, Madison, Marshall, Nicholas, Paterson, 
Randolph, Tucker, and Wilson regarding a March 6, 1779, Resolution of the 
Continental Congress, and an April 15, 1787 letter of the Continental Congress, 
quoted in id., at 221 n.55 (“[I]t is our duty to take care that all the rights . . . by 
the laws of nations . . . remain inviolate.”), regarding the primacy of customary 
laws of nations over congressional legislation). Further, it was understood that 
the people are bound by international law and could not delegate to the federal 
government a power that they did not possess; see id. at 208–16. 
 19. See, e.g., Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 315–16 (Field, J., dissenting) 
(“[L]egislation founded [on] the war powers . . . is subject to limitations . . . 
imposed by the law of nations . . . .[T]he power to prosecute war . . . is a power 
to prosecute war according to the law of nations, and not in violation of that law. 
The power to make rules . . . is . . . subject to the condition that they are within 
the law of nations. There is a limit . . . imposed by the law of nations, and [it] is 
no less binding upon Congress than if the limitation were written in the 
Constitution.”) (alteration in original); Murray, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 77 (“As far 
as Congress have thought proper to legislate us into a state of war, the law of 
nations in war is to apply.”), 118; Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800) 
(Chase, J.) (“If a general war is declared, its extent and operations are only 
restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a part of the law of 
nations . . . .”). For affirmation that international law imposes limitations on or 
310 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2 
War,20 affirm that the customary laws of war must prevail and 
the Manual should note that the laws of war will have primacy 
over conflicting federal statutes. Additionally, the Manual 
should provide clear warning that regardless of whether a 
customary rule of international law could be displaced 
domestically, military personnel must comply with the 
customary rule on the battlefield because, first, domestic law is 
not an excuse,21 and second, violations of international law are 
subject to civil and criminal sanctions in international and 
foreign tribunals.22 
 
exceptions to the war power, see also United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 
622 (1931) (“[T]he war power . . . tolerates no qualifications or limitations, 
unless found in the Constitution or in applicable principles of international 
law.”); United States ex rel. Schlueter v. Watkins, 67 F. Supp. 556, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 
1946) (“By virtue of . . . [the war power], Congress could . . . [act], provided it be 
according to the laws of nations and to treaties.”) (alterations in original) (quote 
by Albert Gallatin, 1798). 
 20. See 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 299–300 (1865) (“Congress . . . cannot 
abrogate them . . . .[L]aws of nations . . . are of binding force upon the 
departments and citizens of the Government, though not defined by any act of 
Congress . . . .Congress cannot abrogate them or authorize their infraction. The 
Constitution does not permit this Government [i.e., the Executive, to do so 
either] . . . .”) (alterations in original). 
 21. See, e.g., VCLT, supra note 15, art. 27 (“A party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”); 
Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Nationals and Other 
Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, at 24–25 (Feb. 4); Report of the International 
Law Commission to the General Assembly, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 12, at 11, 
U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 374, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/34; 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 356, 357, 362–63 (1859) (“A sovereign State 
who tramples upon the public law of the world cannot excuse himself by 
pointing to a provision of her own municipal code . . . [and what you, the 
President,] will do must of course depend upon the law of our own country, as 
controlled and modified by the law of nations.”) (alteration in original); U.S. 
DEP’T OF ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, at 183, ¶ 511 (1956) [hereinafter 
LAW OF LAND WARFARE], https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law_
warfare-1956.pdf (“The fact that domestic law does not impose a penalty for an 
act which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the 
person who committed the act from responsibility under international law.”); 
DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 38, § 1.10.1.4, at 1119, § 18.22.2 (summarizing 
that lack of a penalty under domestic law does not obviate personal 
responsibility); DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 250 (stating that national law is no 
excuse); DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 95 
(2014); see also INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 223 (1947) (“He 
who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance 
of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves outside its 
competence under international law.”). 
 22. See generally infra Part II.C (relating military necessity with potential 
sanctions from violations of international law). 
2017] ERRORS AND MISCONCEPTIONS 311 
B. THE EXECUTIVE HAS AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE TREATIES 
The express and unavoidable constitutional duty of the 
Executive to take care that the laws are faithfully executed 
provides a constitutionally-based competence to do so.23 Notable 
views of the Founders,24 at least eight Supreme Court 
decisions,25 and opinions of three Supreme Court justices while 
on circuit,26 recognized that the president has authority to 
 
 23. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 
82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1567 (1984) (“[T]he President has the duty, as well as 
the authority, to take care that international law as part of the law of the United 
States is faithfully executed. The President does that regularly . . . .”); Jordan 
J. Paust, Medellín, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive 
Authority, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 301, 312 n.40 (2008) [hereinafter 
Paust, The Supremacy of Treaties]; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, § 111, cmt. h (AM. LAW. INST. 1987) (“[I]mplementation by . . . 
appropriate executive or administrative action.”). 
 24. See, e.g., PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra 
note 17, at 180 n.2 (quoting Madison); Paust, The Supremacy of Treaties, supra 
note 23, at 312 (quoting Alexander Hamilton and Representative John 
Marshall). John Marshall’s recognition that the Executive has a duty to execute 
a treaty by any means it possesses was considered to be “masterly and 
conclusive” in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 714 (1893), and 
later in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 684–85 (1952) 
(quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 714). 
 25. See, e.g., Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9, 18 
(1936) (discussing that the president executes extradition treaties with respect 
to extraditable individuals and that the president’s “power, in the absence of [a] 
statute . . . [is] found in the terms of the treaty” as well as where a “treaty 
confers the power”); Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425–26 
(1925) (discussing how the Executive can choose to sue a state agency to enjoin 
it and to enforce “treaty obligations” and “no statute is necessary to authorize 
the suit”); Francis v. Francis, 203 U.S. 233, 240 (1906) (“The location of the 
lands became a duty devolving on the President by the treaty. This duty he 
could execute without an act of Congress; the treaty, when ratified, being the 
supreme law of the land, which the President was bound to see executed.”); 
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 231 (1901) (explaining that executive 
authority in occupied territory is “regulated and limited” as well as “derived 
directly from the laws of war”); Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890) 
(stating executive duty to execute treaties exists and implicitly includes 
authority to assure compliance with all “obligations growing out of . . . our 
international relations”); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 563 
(1884) (Field, J., dissenting) (“[T]reaties must continue to operate as part of our 
municipal law, and be obeyed by the people, applied by the judiciary and 
executed by the President . . . .”); Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 
Pet.) 353, 415 (1840) (“[I]f any act is required on the part of the United States, 
it is to be performed by the executive, and not the legislative power, as declared 
in the case of the Peggy in 1801 . . . .”); Paust, The Supremacy of Treaties, supra 
note 23, at 313 & nn.45–46. 
 26. See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 786 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 
312 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2 
execute treaties. Another Supreme Court decision recognized 
that a treaty can be executed by a sole executive agreement and 
that the president can take measures to comply with the 
agreement.27 
In view of these salient recognitions of the constitutionally-
based competence of the Executive to execute treaties, it is odd 
that the 2015 Manual prefers to emphasize a claim that a non-
self-executing treaty “would require” that Congress execute the 
treaty before it would be law before our courts.28 The Manual 
correctly quotes dictum from the majority opinion in Medellín v. 
Texas,29 but the majority opinion—and hence the Manual—
misses or ignores relevant views of the Founders and each of the 
twelve Supreme Court justice opinions noted above.30 
Furthermore, the dictum in Medellín was clearly in error.31 For 
military personnel, the issue of whether a treaty or portion 
thereof is self-executing as domestic law may at best be 
tangential because, on the battlefield, members of the military 
necessarily execute treaty-based competencies and obligations 
every day. Obviously, some competencies require choice 
regarding proper deployment of combatants, persons who may 
be targeted, and persons who may be detained. In addition, 
treaty-based competencies must be lawfully executed whether 
they are self-operative or not.32 Further, the domestic status of 
a treaty (e.g., as non-self-executing or automatically 
 
13,799) (Curtis, J., on circuit) (“[T]reaties must . . . [be] executed by the 
President.”); In re Sheazle, 21 F. Cas. 1214, 1217 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 
12,734) (Woodbury, J., on circuit) (explaining that the president can exercise 
“ministerial acts” to implement a treaty); United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 
631, 641-42 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865) (Chase, J., on circuit) (“If the 
president, . . . by this treaty, was bound to give this Nash up to justice, he was 
so bound by law; for the treaty is the law of the land . . . .His delivery was the 
necessary act of the president, which he was by the treaty and the law of the 
land, bound to perform; . . . [the] president . . . [had the] duty [of] . . . carrying a 
solemn treaty into effect.”). 
 27. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 530 (1957) (finding that a treaty can 
be executed by executive agreement); PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES, supra note 17, at 79. 
 28. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 38, § 1.10.2.1. 
 29. See id. at 39 n.177 (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–26 
(2008)) (“The responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising 
from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.”). But see 
supra notes 24–27. 
 30. See supra notes 24–27. 
 31. See Paust, The Supremacy of Treaties, supra note 23, at 311–14. 
 32. Because every violation of the laws of war is a war crime (see infra Part 
II A), law of war competencies should be lawfully executed. 
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incorporated domestic law) provides no excuse with respect to 
violations of the treaty.33 
To illustrate the need for choice, Article 5 of the Geneva 
Civilian Convention provides a treaty-based competence of the 
United States to detain a civilian in the country without trial 
where “[the U.S.] is satisfied that an individual . . . is definitely 
suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the 
State.”34 Article 42 adds that detention “may be ordered only if 
the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely 
necessary.”35 Though each provision is incorporated into the 
treaty law of the United States, they nonetheless require an 
executing choice and are therefore not self-operative. 
Nonetheless, when the Executive makes a choice to detain a 
person and thereafter complies with the standards articulated 
in the treaty, the choice to detain can have domestic legal effect 
and the detention will be lawful under the treaty even though 
the Executive decision will be subject to judicial review.36 
C. THERE IS NO LEX SPECIALIS DISPLACEMENT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 
The 2015 Manual’s statement that “the law of war, as the 
lex specialis of armed conflict, is the controlling body of law with 
regard to the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war 
victims”37 is necessarily false. Another manifestly erroneous 
statement is the purported need to construe other laws to avoid 
conflict with the laws of war.38 Rather, each sentence should be 
deleted. As documented in another article with respect to the 
actual interrelationship between human rights law and the laws 
of war, 
 
 33. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 34. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 35. Id. art. 42. 
 36. See, e.g., Paust, Judicial Power, supra note 12, at 507–10, 514, 518–24. 
 37. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 9, § 1.3.2; see also id. at 8 n.11, 9 n.13 
(quoting similar remarks); id. at 22, § 1.6.3.1 (repeating the false claim that the 
law of war is necessarily the controlling body of law). These should be deleted. 
 38. Id. at 10, § 1.3.2.2. The manifestly erroneous claim that there is a 
necessary primacy of laws of war over “other laws” would supposedly include 
primacy over the U.S. Constitution. But see supra note 9 and accompanying 
text. It would also supposedly include all international laws that are jus cogens. 
But see supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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human rights law generally applies on the battlefield 
and in occupied territory. There is no lex specialis law of 
war override of human rights law during war. Indeed, 
two types of human rights have a recognized and 
unavoidable primacy during war and in any other social 
context: (1) customary human rights as rights 
guaranteed through the U.N. Charter and (2) customary 
human rights that have an additional peremptory status 
as rights jus cogens. Additionally, treaty-based human 
rights that are nonderogable must be adhered to and (1) 
have at least a status equal to that of nonderogable laws 
of war, (2) have a status higher than that of derogable 
laws of war, and (3) will not be displaced by non-jus 
cogens laws of war.39 
The 2015 Manual correctly notes, however, that human 
rights law and the laws of war can, and have been, used to 
inform the meaning of each other,40 especially with respect to 
broad human rights standards and limitations contained in 
words such as “arbitrary” that pertain to lawful killings and 
detention during armed conflict.41 
 
 39. Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights on the Battlefield, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 509, 561 (2015) [hereinafter Paust, Human Rights on the Battlefield]; 
see also id. at 519–20, 522–23, 525–26 (documenting these general points and 
noting that human rights law and the laws of war have been used to inform the 
meaning of each set of laws and that “a contrived displacement of human rights 
would also be fundamentally inconsistent with a symmetry of rights and 
obligations that exists in part under each form of law”). The article addresses 
several types of human rights at stake, provides detailed comparison of human 
rights and laws of war applicable during an international armed conflict, and 
illuminates why compliance with global human rights law on a foreign 
battlefield should not inhibit use of lawful measures of warfare under the laws 
of war. See id. at 531–60. 
 40. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 8, § 1.3.2 (“[T]he law of war may 
relate to other bodies of law through . . . law of war rules informing the content 
of general standards in other bodies of law . . . .”); id. at 12, § 1.3.2.3 (“[T]he law 
of war has been used to inform the content of general authorizations to conduct 
military operations.”); id. at 13, § 1.3.2.3 (“[I]nternational courts and 
commissions have characterized human rights . . . by standards and tests 
drawn from the law of war.”). 
 41. Compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“arbitrar[y]” deprivation 
of life), and id. art. 9(1) (“arbitrary” detention), with Paust, Human Rights on 
the Battlefield, supra note 39, at 531–35, 542–44, 561 (noting that lawful killing 
and detention under the laws of war will not be “arbitrary” and adding that 
“some law of war requirements provide contextually relevant meaning, some 
are symmetrical, and some are more strict and limiting than those under global 
human rights law”). 
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D. HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
ITS MILITARY APPLY GLOBALLY 
With respect to the human rights obligations of the United 
States and its military personnel set forth in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the 2015 
Manual repeats an erroneous and needless Executive assertion 
that “the ICCPR [does] not apply abroad.”42 Like the claims 
listed in Part I.C above, this claim should be abandoned. It is 
widely known that the reach of the ICCPR is global and that its 
provisions apply to all persons within the effective control of a 
Party to the treaty as well as in territory that it occupies.43 With 
respect to the reach abroad of the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”),44 the 2015 Manual correctly recognizes that the treaty’s 
phrase “any territory under its jurisdiction”45 requires that the 
CAT provisions “extend to certain areas beyond the sovereign 
 
 42. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 24, § 1.6.3.3, 739, § 11.1.2.6 (setting 
forth a fairly shocking claim that the ICCPR “does not create obligations for an 
Occupying Power with respect to occupied territory”). But see Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 104–106, 112, 128, 136 (July 9) 
(discussing that Articles 12 and 17 of the ICCPR are among those that apply to 
persons in occupied territory). This was also one of the nine false claims that 
Bush-Cheney et al. made in an effort to avoid the restraints of law. See Paust, 
Serial Criminality, supra note 13, at 64 & n.7. This clearly erroneous claim can 
have deleterious consequences regarding deflation of U.S. authority abroad and 
can contribute to terrorist propaganda regarding U.S. adherence to human 
rights law. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Serial War Crimes in Response to 
Terrorism Can Pose Threats to National Security, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
5201, 5214–15, 5218–19, 5221 (2009). The claim is needless because application 
of the ICCPR to persons within the effective control of the U.S. will not inhibit 
lawful measures of warfare. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 43. See, e.g., Paust, Human Rights on the Battlefield, supra note 39, at 520–
22; Paust, Serial Criminality, supra note 13, at 70–74; Human Rights Comm., 
General Comment No. 31, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 
2004) (“anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party,” 
including “those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State 
Party acting outside its territory”). ICCPR obligations also apply to individuals. 
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 41, at 173 (“[r]ealizing that the individual, having 
duties to other individuals”), art. 14(1) (“his . . . obligations”); Human Rights 
Comm., General Comment No. 20, ¶¶ 2, 13, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 
29, 1994) (“whether committed by public officials or other persons acting on 
behalf of the State, or by private persons,” and “whether inflicted by people 
acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity, or in a private 
capacity”); Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under 
Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51 (1992). 
 44. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
 45. See id. art. 2(1). 
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territory of the State Party, and more specifically to ‘all places 
that the State Party controls as a governmental authority.’”46 
Nonetheless, the Manual should at least mention that it is well 
recognized that the CAT also applies wherever a State Party 
exercises effective control over a person and, therefore, that 
United States military personnel will be expected to comply with 
the CAT’s obligations abroad with respect to any detainee within 
their effective control.47 
Most troubling in the context of human rights obligations is 
the failure of the 2015 Manual to mention either the United 
States’ human rights obligations under the United Nations 
Charter or the Charter’s primacy over other international 
agreements.48 The United Nations Charter expressly requires 
that “the United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all.”49 By referring to human rights, the Charter-based mandate 
incorporates customary human rights by reference and requires 
global respect for and observance of customary human rights.50 
 
 46. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 25, § 1.6.3.4, & n.103. 
 47. See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Committee against Torture, United States of America, 
July 25, 2006, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2, ¶¶ 14 (the U.S. “should recognize 
and ensure that the Convention applies at all times, whether in peace, war or 
armed conflict, in any territory under its jurisdiction”), 15 (“provisions of the 
Convention . . . apply to, and are fully enjoyed by, all persons under the effective 
control of its authorities, of whichever type, wherever located in the world”), 17 
(“The State party should ensure that no one is detained in any secret detention 
facility under its de facto effective control. Detaining persons in such 
circumstances constitutes, per se, a violation of the Convention.”), 24 (the U.S. 
“should rescind any interrogation technique—including methods involving 
sexual humiliation, ‘water boarding,’ ‘short shackling,’ and using dogs to induce 
fear, that constitute torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, in all places of detention under its de facto effective control, in 
order to comply with the Convention.”); Paust, Serial Criminality, supra note 
13, at 74–75. 
 48. See U.N. Charter, arts. 55, para. c, 56, 103. 
 49. U.N. Charter arts. 55, para. c, art. 1, para. 3; see also Paust, Human 
Rights on the Battlefield, supra note 39, at 516–20. 
 50. See, e.g., THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, DINAH SHELTON & DAVID STEWART, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 30, 33, 39–40, 124 (3d ed. 
2002); see also MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 274, 302, 325–27 (1980) (explaining 
part of customary human rights law, peremptory human rights and duties jus 
cogens are also protected through the U.N. Charter); Karima Bennoune, All 
Necessary Measures? Reconciling International Legal Regimes Governing Peace 
and Security, and the Protection of Persons, in the Realm of Counter-Terrorism, 
in COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
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This obligation expressly reaches all members of the United 
Nations through Article 56 of the U.N. Charter, which requires 
all members “to take joint and separate action . . . for the 
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.”51 Therefore, 
under the Charter all members of the U.N. have a duty to 
promote, through joint and separate action, “universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all” in accordance with the Charter.52 Further, Charter 
members should not violate customary and Charter-based 
human rights within or outside of their territory.53 There are no 
geographical limitations regarding the obligation to promote 
universal respect for and observance of human rights and there 
are no limits with respect to social contexts, such as those 
involving terrorism, self-defense, or war. Any limits that exist 
with respect to relevant customary human rights of particular 
persons will depend on the nature and reach of relevant human 
rights that are incorporated by reference through Articles 55(c) 
and 56 of the U.N. Charter. 
Importantly, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has 
recognized that “a denial of fundamental human rights is a 
flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the 
Charter.”54 This recognition must necessarily pertain with 
respect to conduct engaged in during an armed conflict that 
violates human rights protected through the U.N. Charter. In 
 
ORDER 667, 676, 680–81 (Larissa Van den Herik & Nico Schrijver eds. 2013). 
 51. U.N. Charter art. 56. 
 52. See id. arts. 55, para. c, 56; see also Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970), 
U.N. G.A. Res. 2625 (“Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and 
separate action universal respect for and observance of human rights”), 25 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971); HURST HANNUM, S. 
JAMES ANAYA & DINAH L. SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: 
PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 83 (5th ed. 2011) (quoting George 
Aldrich, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, “members of the United 
Nations have a legal duty to promote respect for and protection of human rights 
around the world”); MCDOUGAL, supra note 50, at 241 (“universal”), 323 
(“universal”), 339 (“human rights prescriptions are applicable . . . to all the 
activities of nation-states and their officials”). 
 53. See MCDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 50, at 323–25, 328; 
RICHARD B. LILLICH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 69, 74–77, 155 (4th 
ed. 2006) (the duty is to observe, not to violate human rights); 2 THE CHARTER 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 923 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2002). 
 54. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South-Africa 
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 131 (June 21). 
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1980, the United States declared in pleadings before the ICJ that 
several rights reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights are part of customary international law that are also 
operative through the U.N. Charter, adding: 
[F]undamental rights for all human beings . . . and the 
existence of a corresponding duty on the part of every 
State to respect and observe them, are now reflected, 
inter alia, in the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
corresponding portions of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.55 
As recognized by the ICJ in the same case, “[w]rongly to 
deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to 
physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself 
manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles 
enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”56 
Significantly, Article 103 of the United Nations Charter 
assures the primacy of Charter-based human rights duties of 
member States over those in any non-jus cogens treaty by 
mandating that “[i]n the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail.”57 For this reason, if a particular law of 
war treaty, or a portion thereof, is inconsistent with human 
 
 55. Memorial of the Government of the United States of America (U.S. v. 
Iran), Pleadings, 1980 I.C.J. 182, at 182 n.36 (Jan. 12) (declaring that 
customary human rights reflected in the Universal Declaration include those 
set forth in Articles 3 (rights to life, liberty, and security of person), 5 (rights to 
freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment), 7 (equal 
protection), 9 (freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention), 12 (freedom from 
arbitrary interference with privacy), and 13 (freedom of movement)). 
 56. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 
1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 91 (May 24). 
 57. U.N. Charter art. 103; see also MCDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN supra 
note 50, at 339 (“Article 103 of the United Nations Charter and . . . jus 
cogens . . . confirm that the contemporary human rights prescriptions are 
applicable, even inalienably applicable, to all the activities of nation-states and 
their officials.”), 341(“treaties the contents of which violate the generally 
recognized human right . . . .are invalid”) (quoting JOHANN K. BLUNTSCHLI, 
MODERN LAW OF NATIONS OF CIVILIZED STATES (1867)). 
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rights obligations under the U.N. Charter, and if relevant laws 
of war do not have a higher status as jus cogens, the obligations 
under the U.N. Charter to respect and observe human rights 
must prevail. This Charter-based primacy of customary human 
rights is enhanced with jus cogens, because rights and 
concomitant duties jus cogens prevail over any inconsistent non-
jus cogens international agreement or non-jus cogens customary 
international law.58 Necessarily, a lex specialis law of war 
override of Charter-based human rights or human rights jus 
cogens is legally impossible. 
E. THE NATURE AND UNIVERSAL REACH OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Surprisingly, the 2015 Manual declares that customary 
international law must be based on a “virtually uniform” 
practice of States.59 The Manual further claims in error that 
“‘States whose interests are specially affected,’ e.g., States with 
a distinctive history of participation in the relevant matter, must 
support the purported rule.”60 Illogically, the Manual prefers 
that “States that have been persistent objectors to a customary 
international law rule during its development are not bound by 
that rule,” and, therefore, can supposedly engage in deviant 
practice.61 This is inconsistent with the Manual’s claims that the 
practice of States must be virtually uniform and that States 
 
 58. See Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction over 
Foreign Nationals Who Commit International Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REV. 1, 64 
(1996) (“codified laws of war do not eliminate nor nullify the effect of jus 
cogens”); see, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 15. 
 59. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 31, § 1.8.2.1 & n.138. But see id. at 
29, § 1.8 (“Customary international law results from a general and consistent 
practice”) (emphasis deleted and added in part). A radical requirement of 
“virtually uniform” practice would necessarily result in termination of a 
customary rule once it is violated. Further, a single deviant practice would 
prevent the creation of a customary rule and could become a recipe for anarchy. 
 60. DOD MANUAL, supra note 11, at 32, § 1.8.2.3 & n.140. Acceptance of 
this claim would lead to the illogical result that any state that has a history of 
participation in war could defeat the creation or continuation of a customary 
rule by simply not supporting the rule. At Nuremberg, the IMT rejected a claim 
that prohibitions reflected in a law of war treaty allegedly did not apply when a 
number of Germany’s allies had consistently refused to ratify the treaty 
because, despite their persistent refusal, the prohibitions had become part of 
the customary laws of war and were, therefore, universally binding. See 
discussion infra note 118. 
 61. Id. at 30, § 1.8; see also id. at 34, § 1.8.4. 
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whose interests are “specially affected” must uniformly support 
a customary rule. 
Contrary to each of these assertions, it is well recognized 
that the subjective element of customary international law, 
opinio juris (or patterns of expectation that something is legally 
appropriate or required), need only be generally shared in the 
international community.62 As the United States Supreme Court 
aptly recognized in The Paquete Habana, 
 
 62. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 186 (“should generally have been 
treated as”), 187 (“‘great majority of international lawyers’” and “‘it is generally 
considered by publicists’”), 190 (“frequently referred to . . . as being . . . 
customary international law”) (June 27); see also North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 ¶ 74 (Feb. 20) (“a general recognition that a rule of law 
or legal obligation is involved”); id. at 229 (“need not . . . [have] universal 
acceptance” and “some States . . . [could have been] adopting an attitude 
apart . . . [or] may have opposed the rule from its inception . . . [but such] cannot 
be held to have disturbed the formation of a general rule of law”), 231 (“it is 
surely over-exacting to require proof that every State having applied a given 
rule did so because it was conscious of an obligation to do so”) (Lachs, J., 
dissenting); see also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10, at 18 
(Sept. 7) (“International law . . . rules . . . binding upon States . . . emanate [1] 
from their own free will as expressed in conventions or [2] by usages generally 
accepted as expressing principles of law,” which can relate “to the achievement 
of common aims” (emphasis added)); id. at 28 (a rarity of practice “merely would 
show that States had often, in practice, abstained . . . and not that they 
recognized themselves as being obliged . . . [or that they were] being conscious 
of having a duty”); id. at 34 (M. Loder, J., dissenting) (“it rests on a general 
consensus of opinion” and “may be gradually modified, altered or extended, in 
accordance with the views of a considerable majority of these States, as this 
consensus of opinion develops, but it seems to me incorrect to say that the 
municipal law of a minority of States suffices”); id. at 56, 58 (Lord Finlay, J., 
dissenting) (has not been such “general consent”); id. at 60 (M. Nyholm, J., 
dissenting) (“the foundation of a custom must be the united will of several or 
even of many States constituting a union of wills, or a general consensus of 
opinion”); id. at 96 (M. Altamira, J., dissenting) (patterns of municipal 
legislation are “of no value . . . unless it has been duly ascertained that general 
agreement prevails” about international law); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 
677, 691 (“general recognition”), 694 (“by the general assent of civilized 
nations”), 700 (“the approved usage of nations, or the general opinion respecting 
their mutual conduct,”) (quoting HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 15 (Richard Henry Dana ed., 8th ed. 1866)), 701 
(“determined by the general consent of civilized nations”), 708 (quoted supra 
note 12), 711 (“by the general consent of civilized nations”), 717 (“by the general 
consent of the civilized nations”) (1900); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187–
88 (1871) (quoted in text associated with note 63 infra); The Prize Cases, 67 
U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863) (“founded on the common consent as well as the 
common sense of the world”); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 115 (1825) 
(“general acquiescence”), 121 (“general assent”); Brown v. United States, 12 
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 140 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting) (“by the general consent 
of nations”), 142 (“general opinion”); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227 
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Undoubtedly, no single nation can change the law of the 
sea. That law is of universal obligation . . . .Like all the 
laws of nations, it rests upon the common consent of 
civilized communities. It is of force . . . because it has 
been generally accepted as a rule of conduct . . . [and] by 
the concurrent sanction [of nations].63 
 
(1796) (“established by the general consent of mankind, and binds all nations”); 
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (5th ed. 1998) 
(“general recognition”) (quoting J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 62 (5th ed. 
1955) (one need only identify “general recognition among states of a certain 
practice as obligatory . . . it is not necessary, to show that every state has 
recognized . . . This test is one of general recognition.”) (emphasis in original)); 
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (2d ed. 2005) (“it is sufficient for a 
majority . . . to be aware of its imperative need”); LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED 
PERSPECTIVE 344–55 (2d ed. 2000) (“Uniformity is no more realistically 
required than unanimity . . . The requisite patterns in past behavior and 
subjectivities are generality, not universality . . . The express consent of every 
nation-state is not a prerequisite to the authority of a particular customary 
law . . . the function of customary international law is precisely to vitiate the 
requirement of specific consent as the basis of international obligation.”); 
ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 189–
90, 197 (1971) (“law that is generally accepted or ‘acquiesced in’”); MCDOUGAL, 
LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 50, at 270 (“uniformities in past behavior and 
subjectivities required are those of generality, not of universality” and “the 
function of . . . [C.I.L.] is precisely to eliminate any requirement of specific 
consent as a basis of international obligation”); PAUST, supra note 17, at 3–4, 
18–19 nn.2–4, 21 n.11; PAUST ET AL., supra note 15, at 29 (“grows out of the 
common reactions and the composite thinking . . . the general attitude of the 
citizens of states . . . unanimity . . . is not required”)) (quoting United States v. 
Von Leeb (U.S. Mil. Tribunal 1948); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND 
REVISION 556 (1971) (customary international law “is a set of shared 
subjectivities about normative behavior . . . [A] majority of the nations of the 
world may . . . make law for all states of the globe, they may do the same by 
custom. In this regard . . . unanimity is not required.”); see also Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 266, 495 (July 8) (Weeramantry, 
J., dissenting) (“It would be an interpretation totally out of context that the 
‘Lotus’ decision formulated a theory . . . that a State could do whatever it 
pleased so long as it had not bound itself to the contrary,” an admonition that 
is clearly correct in view of the actual language used in the S.S. Lotus case 
quoted above concerning the difference between (1) international agreements, 
supposedly binding because of “free will” to join, and (2) customary 
international law that is binding when “usages [are] generally accepted” as 
law). With respect to the Lotus case, see generally An Hertogen, Letting Lotus 
Bloom, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 901 (2015) (demonstrating that an alleged principle 
of freedom state action unless such is explicitly restrained by international law 
and a related theory that a state can only be restricted by a prohibition that it 
has consented to are not supported by a proper reading of the majority opinion 
in the Lotus case). 
 63. Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 187–88 (Chase, J.), quoted in Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. at 711. 
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Similarly, the behavioral element of customary 
international law (i.e., general patterns of practice) is free from 
the need for total conformity,64 and it rests not merely upon the 
practice of States as such, but ultimately upon the practice of all 
participants in the international legal process.65 Therefore, a 
particular State might disagree as to whether a particular norm 
is customary, and in fact that State might even violate such a 
norm. Nonetheless, the State would still be bound if the norm is 
supported by patterns of generally shared legal expectations and 
 
 64. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b) 
(“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” 
(emphasis added)), T.S. No. 993, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945); see also Nicar. v. U.S., 
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 184 (“the essential role played by general practice” 
(quoted in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 
I.C.J. 144, ¶ 12 (Feb. 14) (Van Den Wyngaert, J., dissenting))), 186 (“sufficient 
that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent”); North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 229 (“a practice widespread enough,” 
“‘generally . . . adopted in the practice of States’” (quoting “Fisheries Case, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 128”), “the behaviour of a great number of 
States, possibly the majority,” and some states may have acted “at variance”), 
231 (“general practice”) (Lachs, J., dissenting); Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 710 
(“a rule of international law, established by the general usage of civilized 
nations”); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 119 (“general” practice) (1825); 
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 124 (1814) (Marshall, C.J.) 
(“although the practice in this respect may not be uniform”); BROWNLIE, supra 
note 62, at 4 (“generality of practice” and “universality is not required”); 
CASSESE, supra note 62, at 165 (“sufficient for a majority . . . to engage in a 
consistent practice” and “universal . . . participation in the formation . . . is not 
required”); CHEN, supra note 62; PAUST, supra note 15, at 93–94, 106–08; see 
infra note 85 and accompanying text. Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 
1969 I.C.J. at 43 ¶ 74 (while merely focusing on whether “the passage of only a 
short period of time . . . [is] a bar to the formation of a new rule . . . , an 
indisputable requirement would be that within the period in question . . . 
practice . . . should have been both extensive and virtually uniform”). One 
should not misread this last statement to mean that practice must always be 
virtually uniform, a radical test that would likely result in the lack of any rule 
of customary international law. 
 65. See, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 15, at 107 (explaining that 
international law has never been merely state-to-state and there have been 
certain non-state actors with formal participatory roles in the creation and 
shaping of international law); Jordan J. Paust, Non-State Actor Participation in 
Int’l Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 977, 979–81, 983 n.12, 
994–97 (2011) [hereinafter Paust, Non-State Actor Participation in Int’l Law 
and the Pretense of Exclusion]. For this reason, the DOD MANUAL’s statement 
that “[t]raditionally, international law has governed relations between States” 
and that there is predominantly an inter-state nature of international 
obligations is ahistorical, misleading, and should be deleted (see DOD MANUAL, 
supra note 1, at 37, § 1.10.1.3). Rights and obligations can pertain for states, 
nations, peoples, tribes, belligerents, insurgents, corporations, other groups, 
and individuals. See generally Paust, Non-State Actor Participation in Int’l Law 
and the Pretense of Exclusion supra, at 979–89. 
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conforming behavior extant in the community.66 If the patterns 
of violation become too widespread, however, one of the primary 
bases of customary law may be lost. As recognized by the ICJ, 
It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the 
application of the rules in question should have been 
perfect . . . with complete consistency . . . .In order to 
deduce the existence of customary rules . . . it [is] 
sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, 
be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State 
conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally 
have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as 
indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts 
in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, 
but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or 
justifications contained within the rule itself . . . the 
significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to 
weaken the rule.67 
As noted above, the 2015 DOD Manual sets forth a 
preference regarding objectors who persistently oppose a 
particular norm during that norm’s formation as customary 
international law.68 This so-called persistent-objector preference 
for avoiding responsibility under customary international law is 
not reflected in any known treaty or General Assembly 
resolution. Rather, it is the preference of a few professors and 
those who wrote the Restatement in the 1980s.69 Although there 
is supportive dictum in rare cases, no known case has actually 
 
 66. See PAUST ET AL., supra note 15, at 111 (regarding the practice of 
violators). 
 67. See Nicar. v. U.S.,1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 184, 186. 
 68. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102, cmts. b & d (AM. LAW INST. 1987); (“in principle” 
although “historically, such . . . exemption . . . has been rare”—citing no actual 
case or incident, but misconstruing what was involved in the Fisheries Case 
(U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18)); see also PAUST, supra note 
17, at 22–26 n.14. The 1951 Fisheries case did not address objection to the 
existence of a customary rule of law concerning a coastal state’s right to a 
territorial sea. Instead, the Court addressed the necessary circumstance at the 
time for extension of the Norwegian territorial sea up to four nautical miles and 
its need to control that area without significant interruption or objection over a 
long period of time (i.e., factors of control and intent that are relevant to the 
reach of a particular territorial sea, not to the existence of the rule of customary 
law concerning the existence of territorial seas under the customary law of the 
sea). See generally U.K. v. Nor., 1951 I.C.J. at 116. 
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used the minority persistent-objector preference to decide a case 
or to determine that customary international law is not binding 
on a “persistent objector.”70 Moreover, this theory is inconsistent 
with predominant trends in international, domestic, and other 
judicial opinions.71 It is theoretically unsound because 
customary international law does not require consent and rests 
upon general patterns of expectation or opinion. Further, the 
preference cannot be a rule of customary international law 
concerning the nature or reach of customary international law 
because the preference is not supported by the two general 
requirements for the existence of a rule of customary 
international law: (1) general patterns of conforming practice;72 
 
 70. See CASSESE, supra note 62, at 163 (quoted infra note 74). C.f. Alvarez-
Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 613 (9th Cir. 2003) (dictum); Princz v. 
Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., 
dissenting); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (citing the Restatement and stating in significant error that 
customary international law rests on “consent” as opposed to general patterns 
of expectation). 
 71. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 15, at 111; Nicar. v. U.S.,1986 I.C.J. Rep. 
14, ¶¶ 184, 186; supra note 64 and accompanying text; infra notes 83–84 and 
accompanying text; see also CASSESE, supra note 62, at 162–63 (explaining the 
claim is not “tenable today,” “there is no firm support in State practice and 
international case law,” and “a State is not entitled to claim that it is not bound 
by a new customary rule because it opposed it before it ripened into a customary 
rule.” “[T]wo obiter dicta of the ICJ” were the 1950 Asylum Case (Colom. v. 
Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277–78, and the 1951 Fisheries Case. Regarding the 
Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), see supra note 69; Jonathan I. Charney, Universal 
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 538–40 (1993) (explaining it is rarely 
claimed, it is not supported by state practice, the I.C.J. mentioned it only twice 
in dicta, “[t]hus, state practice and other evidence do not support the existence 
of the persistent objector rule”); see also Anthony D’Amato, Groundwork for 
International Law, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 650, 659 (2015) (explaining “[i]ndividual 
members of a system cannot tell the system what to do”), 660 (C.I.L. “is not 
created by the will . . . [or] consent of individual states”), 667 (“[t]here can be no 
‘persistent objector’ exception to customary-law formation” and such would 
“strain, if not tear a hole in, the fabric of the network” or system of international 
law); D. W. Bowett, The Impact of the U.N. Structure, Including that of the 
Specialized Agencies, on the Law of International Organization, 64 AM. J. OF 
INT’L L. 48, 57 (explaining remarks from Myres S. McDougal, “The realistic 
function of customary law has been to get rid of minority veto, either in the 
making or the termination of a principle.”); W. Michael Reisman, International 
Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 PROC., AM. SOC. INT’L L. 101, 111 
(1981) (explaining “norms are prescribed because they are policies which part 
of the community does not voluntarily or spontaneously support”); infra note 73 
and accompanying text; Jose E. Alvarez, Positivism Regained, Nihilism 
Postponed, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 747, 780 (1994) (explaining there is “little 
evidence that such objectors actually exist”). Regarding a relevant decision of 
the I.M.T. at Nuremberg, see supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 72. See supra notes 64, 71 and accompanying texts. 
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and (2) general patterns of conforming opinio juris.73 For this 
reason, use of the preference in the Manual will not protect 
United States military personnel from criminal or civil 
responsibility for violations of customary international law. 
As the United States Supreme Court declared emphatically, 
customary international “law is of universal obligation.”74 Most 
significantly, the ICJ has rejected the possibility of an opt-out 
from the reach of customary international law. It emphasizes 
that, unlike choosing whether to become a party to a treaty or to 
join with reservations, declarations, or understandings 
(“RUDs”), “customary law rules and obligations[,] . . . by their 
very nature, must have equal force for all members of the 
international community, and cannot therefore be the subject of 
any right of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any one of 
them in its own favour.”75 
II. OTHER ERRORS AND CONCERNS 
A. WAR CRIME BY ANY OTHER NAME 
Any violation of the laws of war is a war crime.76 However, 
the 2015 Manual attempts to rewrite the laws of war on the basis 
 
 73. See PAUST, VAN DYKE & MALONE, supra note 15, at 11; Nicar. v. U.S., 
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 184, 186. 
 74. The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187 (1871); see also Ware v. Hylton, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227 (1796) (“established by the general consent of mankind, 
and binds all nations”); PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 
supra note 17, at 22–26 n.14 (addressing numerous cases and materials 
regarding the universal reach of customary international law). 
 75. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 4, ¶ 63. This quoted 
language was used after the dicta in the 1951 Fisheries Case and the 1950 
Asylum Case (which some writers claim is the basis for the preference). The 
language quoted in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases necessarily rejects 
prior dicta regarding an alleged ability of a persistent objector to avoid being 
bound by customary international law and reliance on the prior dicta would be 
decidedly inappropriate. The DOD Manual relies on the prior dicta. See DOD 
MANUAL, supra note 1, 34 n.149. The erroneous preference should be deleted. 
 76. See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, IV COMMENTARY: GENEVA 
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF 
WAR OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 583 (1958) [hereinafter IV COMMENTARY] (“The 
Geneva Conventions form part of what are generally called the laws and 
customs of war, violations of which are commonly called ‘war crimes.’”); INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, III COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE 
TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 421 (1960) 
[hereinafter III COMMENTARY] (“The International Law Commission has 
defined war crimes as: ‘Acts in violation of the laws or customs of war’”); LAW 
OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 21, ¶ 499, at 178 (“Every violation of the law of 
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of unknown and unproven “usage”77 and, allegedly, a United 
States statute,78 to exclude criminal responsibility for “minor” 
violations as well as those that are not “particularly serious.”79 
Importantly, however, “usage . . . is merely long-term practice, 
not law.”80 Moreover, one domestic statute cannot change treaty-
based or customary laws of war.81 In addition, domestic law 
provides no excuse, and there is no evidence that the United 
States statute attempts to redefine the laws of war to exclude 
criminal responsibility for minor, non-serious violations, or any 
of the other numerous violations of the laws of war that are not 
explicitly listed in the statute.82 On the contrary, the statute 
addressed in the Manual expressly covers only certain crimes 
under certain “circumstances described,”83 and alerts the reader 
that the list of crimes set forth is not a complete list, noting “[a]s 
used in this section the term [sic] ‘war crime’ means any conduct” 
expressly set forth.84 Additionally, it would be nonsensical to 
claim that the short list contained in the statute is a list of all 
“serious” war crimes,85 much less all war crimes generally. 
 
war is a war crime”), ¶ 504, at 180 (“violations of the law of war (‘war crimes’)”); 
DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1076, § 18.9.5.1 & nn.102–03; UK MANUAL, 
supra note 3, at 424, §16.21 (“War crimes . . . ‘violations of the laws or customs 
of war’”) (quoting the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg); Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, art. 
6(b), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (“War crimes: namely, violations of the laws 
or customs of war.”); Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East, art. 5(b), Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 (“Namely, violations of the laws 
or customs of war . . . .”); Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons 
Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, December 
20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946), art. 
II(1)(b) (“War Crimes. Atrocities or offences against persons or property, 
constituting violations of the laws or customs of war”); Principles of the 
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 21, princ. VI(b) (“War crimes: Violations of the 
laws and customs of war . . . .”); PAUST ET AL., supra note 3, at 673, 677 n.6, 
700–01, 709. 
 77. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 107, § 18.9.5.2. 
 78. See id. at 1076, § 18.9.5.2 & n.106 (quoting part of 18 U.S.C. § 2441 
(2006)). 
 79. See id. at 1076, § 18.9.5.2. 
 80. PAUST ET AL., supra note 3, at 7. 
 81. See generally supra notes 21, 67 and accompanying text. 
 82. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441. 
 83. Id. § 2441(a) (explaining that war crimes committed “in any of the 
circumstances described in subsection (b)” will result in a punishment). 
 84. Id. § 2441(c). 
 85. Compare the far more extensive list of serious war crimes, itself still 
incomplete and limiting of jurisdiction, in the Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 
8(2) (“[f]or purposes of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means”), 8(2)(a) (“[g]rave 
breaches”), 8(2)(b) (“[o]ther serious violations”), 8(2)(c) (“serious violations”), 
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Further, another federal statute incorporates all offenses under 
the laws of war as crimes under the law of the United States,86 
and prosecution of any war crime can occur in United States 
military tribunals,87 or in a federal district court.88 Of course, 
those responsible for authorizing, committing, or abetting a war 
crime can also be prosecuted in an international or foreign state 
tribunal that has jurisdiction.89 
B. THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 
With respect to civil sanctions for war crimes, the 2015 
Manual is at the very least misleading when it suggests that 
there is no private right to compensation under customary 
international law.90 Whether or not private claims can be made 
directly against a State,91 there have been a number of 
successful civil suits against individuals and corporations for 
both direct and complicit responsibility for violations of the laws 
 
8(2)(e) “[o]ther serious violations”)), with id. art. 5 (stating “jurisdiction of the 
Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole”), and art. 22(3) (stating the limits of ICC jurisdiction 
“shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under 
international law independently of this Statute.”). 
 86. See 10 U.S.C. § 818; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1946); Ex parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30 (1942) (“Congress has incorporated by reference . . . 
all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war . . . .”); United States v. 
Schultz, 4 C.M.R. 104, 111, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 512, 519, (1952) (“Congress 
incorporated by reference . . . all offenses which are defined as such the law of 
war”); Jordan J. Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crime Jurisdiction Over 
Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REV. 6, 10–12 (1971) [hereinafter 
Paust, After My Lai]. 
 87. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821; LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 21, ¶ 
505(d)-(e), at 180–81; Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and 
Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 123–24 (1992) (addressing U.S. 
recognitions regarding the existence of early U.S. implementing legislation with 
respect to violations of the Geneva Conventions). 
 88. See PAUST ET AL., supra note 3, at 273–79 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 
Paust, After Mai Lai, supra note 86, at 10–28). 
 89. See generally id. at 15, 179–87 (regarding universal jurisdictional 
competence of all states), 582–83 (regarding ICC jurisdiction). 
 90. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 37, § 1.10.1.3 (stating that private 
individuals do not have a right “to claim compensation directly from a State for 
violations of the law of war,” but correctly noting that “there may be 
responsibility for individuals, apart from State responsibility”); id. at 1092, 
§ 18.16.4. 
 91. With respect to claims in response to the United States’ violations of 
international law, see generally The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 371, 374, 
376–79 (1824); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 350–55 (1822). 
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of war.92 The Manual should inform military personnel of the 
possibility of civil sanctions in the United States and abroad if 
they violate the laws of war or other forms of relevant 
international law. 
C. MILITARY NECESSITY 
The 2015 Manual appears to slightly loosen the general 
requirement of military necessity regarding permissible 
measures of warfare from customary standards—such as certain 
 
 92. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762-63 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“criminal courts of many 
nations combine civil and criminal proceedings, allowing those injured . . . to 
recover damages . . . [and] universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily 
contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery”); United States v. The 
Spanish Smack Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453, 463–64 (1903); The Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 711, 714 (1900); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 671 F.3d 
736, 743–44, 747, 749, 763–67 (9th Cir. 2011); Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber 
Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2011); Weisshaus v. Swiss Bankers Ass’n, 225 
F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 777 (9th Cir. 
1996) (regarding command responsibility); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242–
43 (2d Cir. 1995); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 336-37 (11th Cir. 1992); 
Warfaa v. Ali, 33 F. Supp. 3d 653 (E.D. Va. 2014); Yousuf v. Samantar, 2012 
WL 3730617 (E.D. Va. 2012); Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. 
Supp. 2d 1250, 1259–61 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 310–11, 320–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Barrueto v. Larios, 205 F. Supp.2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Mehinovic v. 
Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1350–52 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Doe v. Islamic 
Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 5, 8 (D.D.C. 1998); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. 
Supp. 162, 171–72 (D. Mass. 1995); Dills v. Hatcher, 69 Ky. 606 (1869); 
Ferguson v. Loar, 68 Ky. 689, 692–95 (1869); Lewis v. McGuire, 66 Ky. 202, 203 
(1867); Terrill v. Rankin, 65 Ky. 453, 457–62 (1867); Christian Cty. Court v. 
Rankin & Tharp, 63 Ky. 502, 505–06 (1866); PAUST, ET AL., supra note 3, at 
734–35; PAUST, supra note 17, at 226–27, 291 nn.488–91, 293 n.503, 313 n.581; 
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 554-55 (ICRC 2005) (stating that individual civil 
liability is possible in many countries); WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND 
PRECEDENTS 780 n.31 (2d ed. 1920); supra note 12 and accompanying text; see 
also Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 3, art. 75(2); CAT, supra note 44, art. 
14(1); ICCPR, supra note 41, arts. 2(3)(a), 14(1), 50 (regarding the express 
mandate, in self-executing language that was approved by the United States, 
that all of the provisions of the ICCPR “shall extend to all parts of federal States 
without any limitations or exceptions”); Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 8; 
General Comment No. 24, supra note 15, ¶¶ 11–12 (regarding the right of access 
to courts and to an adequate remedy). 
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measures “necessary,”93 “indispensable,”94 and “required”95—to 
“all measures needed” for certain military purposes. 96 However, 
the phrase “measures needed” may reflect general practice and 
opinio juris97 and may set a higher threshold than the phrases 
“definite,” “concrete and direct military advantage,” which 
appear in Geneva Protocol I.98 This is because what is considered 
a definite, concrete, and direct advantage may not be needed in 
a given circumstance.99 
 
 93. See LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 21, ¶ 3a, at 3 (“not actually 
necessary for military purposes”); Instructions for the Government of Armies of 
the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, § I, art. 14 (1866) 
[hereinafter Lieber Code] (“Military necessity . . . consists in the necessity of 
those measures which are indispensable . . . .”). The DOD Manual recognizes 
the interrelated principle of humanity which “forbids the infliction of suffering, 
injury, or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose.” 
DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 58, § 2.3 (emphasis added); see also id. at 59, 
§ 2.3.1.1 (“Humanity is related to military necessity, and these principles 
logically complement one another.”). 
 94. See Lieber Code, supra note 93, § I, art. 14 (“indispensable for securing 
the ends of the war and, which are lawful”); art. 15 (“Military necessity admits 
of all direct destruction of life and limb of armed enemies, and of other persons 
whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable . . . .”) (emphasis added); LAW OF 
LAND WARFARE, supra note 21, ¶ 3a, at 4 (“indispensable”); DOD MANUAL, 
supra note 1, at 52 nn.13, 15. 
 95. See, e.g., UK MANUAL, supra note 3, at 21, § 2.2; Christopher 
Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 35 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
 96. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 52, § 2.2; see also DOD MANUAL, supra 
note 1, at 58, § 2.3. 
 97. See Jordan J. Paust, Operationalizing Use of Drones Against Non-State 
Terrorists Under the International Law of Self-Defense, 8 ALBANY GOV’T. L. REV. 
166, 191 (2015) (using the phrase “reasonably necessary” with respect to an 
analogous jus ad bellum principle of necessity). 
 98. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 
51(5)(b) [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I] (“concrete and direct military 
advantage”), 52(2) (“definite”), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 
(1977). The DOD Manual addresses “concrete and direct military advantage” 
with respect to the requirement to “refrain from attacks in which the expected 
loss of life or injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the 
attack, would be excessive.” DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 241, § 5.12 (“the 
proportionality rule”). 
 99. The meaning of the word “advantage” is close to the unacceptable 
military “benefit” or Kriegsraison [war reason] theory. See PAUST ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 718; cf. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 265–69 (2d ed. 2010) (addressing 
Kriegsraison as a theory that the “military necessity in war overrides the law 
of war,” but quoting a writer who stated that the theory claimed permissibility 
for whatever is of a “‘military advantage.’” Id. at 267 (quoting William Downey, 
The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 251, 253 (1953)). At 
the very least, one should not use the phrase “military advantage” as if it is the 
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D. TARGETABLE CIVILIANS WHO ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS 
IN HOSTILITIES (“DPH”) 
The 2015 Manual accepts the customary rule that 
“[c]ivilians who take a direct part in hostilities [and, therefore, 
who are DPH] forfeit protection from being made the object of 
attack.”100 The rule is famously reflected in Article 51(3) of 
Geneva Protocol I101 and is widely known to be part of the 
customary laws of war.102 However, the Manual incorrectly 
states that Article 51(3) “does not reflect customary 
international law,”103 and further attempts to expand the test 
regarding who is DPH and targetable to include an alleged but 
unproven permissibility under customary laws of war of 
targeting civilians who do not actually take a “direct part in” 
hostilities, but who “effectively and substantially contribute to 
an adversary’s ability to conduct or sustain combat 
operations.”104 Scholars have already noted that this attempted 
expansion is in error and will not protect the United States or its 
military personnel from responsibility under international 
law.105 Moreover, when 153 states voted in Rome in 1998 to 
create the ICC, they expressly affirmed that “serious violations 
of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict [include] . . . [i]ntentionally directing attacks against . . . 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.”106 
 
test without the further limitations set forth in Geneva Protocol I that require 
the existence of a “definite,” “concrete and direct” advantage. See Geneva 
Protocol I, supra note 98. 
 100. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 222, § 5.9. 
 101. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 98, art. 51(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the 
protection . . . [from being the object of attack] unless and for such time as they 
take a direct part in hostilities.”). 
 102. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 27, 129, 152; HENCKAERTS & 
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 92, at 19–21; NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 319, 321–22, 328–29, 333, 341 (2008); PAUST ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 719–20; UK MANUAL, supra note 3, at 54, §§ 5.3.2–5.3.3. 
 103. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 223, § 5.9.1.2. 
 104. Id. at 224–25, § 5.9.3 (emphasis added). 
 105. See, e.g., Adil Ahmad Haque, Off Target: Selection, Precaution, and 
Proportionality in the DOD Manual, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 31, 32 (2016); see also 
MELZER, supra note 102, at 341 (“[where] proposals extend the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities to the general war effort without requiring a direct 
connection to the hostilities . . . they clearly go beyond what conventional and 
customary IHL permits.”). 
 106. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(i). One-hundred and fifty-three 
states voted in favor of the Statute, seven against (including the United States). 
See PAUST ET AL., supra note 3, at 580 & n.1. 
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The 2015 Manual should abandon the erroneous attempt to 
expand DPH status to those who merely contribute to an 
enemy’s ability to conduct and sustain combat. Logically, a 
civilian who substantially contributes to an ability to conduct or 
sustain combat operations would include financiers of the armed 
conflict,107 enemy gun manufacturers and suppliers, scientists in 
an enemy’s weapons factory,108 and workers in an enemy’s bullet 
factory.109 Although combat will be short-lived without money, 
guns, and bullets, it is evident that none of these persons are 
generally expected to be DPH and targetable.110 
E. WEAPONS OF A NATURE TO CAUSE SUPERFLUOUS INJURY 
OR UNNECESSARY SUFFERING 
Specifically, the 2015 Manual uses an incorrect “calculated 
to cause” test,111 instead of the authoritative and widely-known 
test under treaty-based and customary laws of war regarding the 
use of weapons or material “of a nature to cause” superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering, which is the proper test 
regarding criminal responsibility.112 The Manual should inform 
 
 107. But see MELZER, supra note 102, at 341, 345; NILS MELZER, INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 
51–52, 54 (2009). 
 108. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 226 n.232. 
 109. But see id. at 229, § 5.9.3.3 & n.242; DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 152; 
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 92, at 23; UK MANUAL, supra note 
3, at 54, § 5.3.3. 
 110. See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Judgment, ¶ 177 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008) (“[e]xamples of [non-
targetable] indirect participation in hostilities include . . . selling goods to one 
of the parties to the conflict, . . . supplying food to one of the parties to the 
conflict, . . . transporting arms and munitions”); Michael W. Lewis, Drones and 
the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT’L L. J. 293, 309–10 (2012); Paust, 
supra note 97, at 179 n.34 (quoting lists of persons who are DPH); see also supra 
note 105 and accompanying text. 
 111. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 314, §§ 6.2.2, 6.5.4.4 (“only prohibited if 
they are calculated to cause superfluous injury”), at 334, §§ 6.6, 6.6.1. But see 
id. at 334, § 6.6.1 (“or of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering”). 
 112. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 58–59; PAUST ET AL, supra note 3, 
at 716; Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, Annex, art. 23(e) (French version: “propres à causer des maux 
superflus”), 15 U.N.T.S. 9 (1907) [hereinafter HC IV]; Hague Convention (No. 
II) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, art. 23(e) (French 
version), 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; Geneva Protocol I, supra note 98, art. 35(2) 
(“It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material . . . of a nature to 
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”); UK MANUAL, supra note 
332 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2 
military personnel of the force prohibition in order to alert them 
to what the international community expects—namely, to more 
properly test weapons for compliance, and to more adequately 
assure conduct conforming to the laws of war. 
F. DUM-DUM BULLETS 
The Department of Defense’s 2015 Manual claims that use 
of expanding, or “dum-dum,” bullets is permissible despite the 
well-known prohibition reflected in the 1899 Hague Declaration, 
condemning “use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the 
human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does 
not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions.”113 The 
Manual claims that the 1899 Declaration does not reflect 
customary international law114 and that it contains a 
participation clause that requires that all State parties to a 
conflict be parties to the Declaration lest it will not apply.115 
However, the Declaration reflects customary international 
law116 and, as recognized by the International Military Tribunal 
 
3, § 15.28 (“weapons of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous 
injury”); Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(xx) (“[e]mploying weapons, 
projectiles and material . . . of a nature to cause”); see also LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE, supra note 21, at foreword (“the official text of the Hague 
Conventions of 18 October 1907 is the French text which must be accepted as 
controlling”). Use of the word “calculated” would create a higher mens rea 
standard than that reflected in treaties and customary laws of war. 
 113. See Hague Declaration No. IV ¶ 3 (July 29, 1899), reprinted in PAUST 
ET AL., supra note 3, at 715; see also DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 325, 
§ 6.5.4.4. 
 114. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 323–35, § 6.5.4.4. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See, e.g., LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND ARMED CONFLICT 41 (2013) (“weapons causing unnecessary suffering, such 
as dum-dum bullets . . . are outlawed”); CORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 189 
(stating that “dum-dum rounds” are prohibited because of the prohibition of use 
of weapons “causing unnecessary suffering”), 207–08; DINSTEIN, supra note 3, 
at 64; HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 92, at 268–71; SOLIS, supra 
note 99, at 38 (“hollow-point bullets are prohibited”), 55 (the 1899 Declaration’s 
“prohibition of dum-dums became customary law”); Stefan Oeter, Methods and 
Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
119, 128 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008); Jordan J. Paust, Does Your Police Force 
Use Illegal Weapons? A Configurative Approach to Decision Integrating 
International and Domestic Law, 18 HARV. INT’L L. J. 19, 32–33, 35–36 (1977); 
Paul A. Robblee, Jr., The Legitimacy of Modern Conventional Weaponry, 71 MIL. 
L. REV. 95, 105 (1976) (the prohibition of “dum-dum bullets attained the status 
of customary international law during the First World War”); LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE, supra note 21, ¶ 34b (“Usage has . . . established the illegality of the 
use of . . . irregular shaped bullets . . . and the scoring of the surface or the filing 
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at Nuremberg with respect to a similar participation clause in 
the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV, once what is reflected in an 
international agreement becomes customary international law, 
such limiting clauses are of no effect with respect to the 
universal reach of substantive customary rights, duties, and 
competencies.117 For these reasons, the section on expanding 
bullets should be revised. 
G. CONCERNS REGARDING USE OF HERBICIDES IN WAR AND 
DESTRUCTION OF FOOD OR WATER 
The 2015 Manual declares that the United States has 
renounced the first use of herbicides in war “as a matter of 
national policy . . . [except] . . . for control of vegetation within 
U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate 
 
off of the ends of the hard cases of bullets.”); UK MANUAL, supra note 3, at 9, 
§§ 1.25 & 1.25.1; id. at 109, §§ 6.9 & 6.9.1 & n.32; List of War Crimes prepared 
by the Responsibilities Commission of the Paris Peace Conference, crime 
number 27 (prohibiting the “[u]se of . . . expanding bullets”) (Mar. 29, 1919) 
[hereinafter 1919 List], reprinted in PAUST ET AL., supra note 3, at 45–46 
(nothing that members of the Commission that created this list on behalf of the 
Conference were Belgium, British Empire, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, 
Poland, Romania, Serbia, and the United States). Cf Joshua F. Berry, Hollow 
Point Bullets: How History Has Hijacked Their Use in Combat and Why It is 
Time to Reexamine the 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets, 
206 MIL. L. REV. 88 (2010) (providing an interesting argument for changing the 
law of war from an absolute prohibition to regulation of use under the principle 
of military necessity and the related prohibition of unnecessary death, injury, 
or suffering of civilians during combat in urban areas); Sean Watts, Regulation-
Tolerant Weapons, Regulation-Resistant Weapons and the Law of War, 91 INT’L 
L. STUD. 540, 571–72 (2015) (“It is widely agreed that general use of expanding 
bullets violates customary international law” and conforming practice has “been 
relatively strong”). 
When 153 States voted in Rome to create the Rome Statute, they recognized the 
customary and serious war crime of “[e]mploying bullets which expand or 
flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which 
does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions.” Rome Statute, 
supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(xix). This is nearly the exact language found in the 
1899 Declaration. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(xix) with 
supra text accompanying note 109. Cf. Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(b)(xix), 
quoted in the DOD Manual, which requires an alleged perpetrator to be “‘aware 
that the nature of the bullets was such that their employment would uselessly 
aggravate suffering or the wounding effect’” of such bullets. See DOD MANUAL, 
supra note 1, at 325, § 6.5.4.5 & n.84. 
 117. See In re Goering, 13 ILR 203 (Int’l Mil. Trib. 1946), reprinted in PAUST 
ET AL., supra note 3, at 494–95; see also DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1144, 
§ 3.6.1 & n.99; ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS 
OF WAR 63 (3d ed. 2003) (as customary law, “its ‘general participation clause’ 
would cease to be relevant.”). 
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defensive perimeters.”118 The Manual rightly notes that 
“[h]erbicides that are harmless to human beings are not 
prohibited under the rule against the use of poison or poisoned 
weapons.”119 However, policy could change and, as noted in this 
section, some herbicides can be poisonous and trigger the 
prohibition of deleterious or asphyxiating gases or chemicals, 
especially when herbicides are used on or indiscriminately near 
crops and water. Further, the preamble to the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention recognizes “the prohibition, embodied in 
the pertinent agreements and relevant principles of 
international law, of the use of herbicides as a method of 
warfare.”120 Therefore, important concerns are raised regarding 
proper or any use of certain herbicides during warfare, especially 
if United States policy prevents merely their first use in war, 
and the Manual does not provide adequate attention to relevant 
legal requirements and needed guidance for military personnel. 
1. The Absolute Prohibition of Use of Poison in Any Form 
Use of poison by any means is a war crime under customary 
and treaty-based international law. Customary international 
law reflected in Article 23(a) of the Annex to the 1907 Hague 
Convention expressly affirms the per se prohibition of poison—
that is, it may never be used under any circumstances and, 
therefore, regardless of attempts at justification or claims of 
military necessity.121 It does not matter how poison is employed 
(e.g., by pellet, liquid or gas, or dropped by hand or modern 
aircraft), and it does not matter against whom the poison is 
employed (e.g., solely against enemy combatants, against a 
mixture of enemy combatants and noncombatants, or in areas 
inhabited merely by noncombatants). By the plain meaning of 
Article 23(a), “to employ” poison in any manner is prohibited. 
Further, the treaty does not merely prohibit “poisoned weapons,” 
 
 118. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 392, § 6.17. 
 119. Id. at 392, § 6.17.1. 
 120. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 
1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317, pmbl. 
 121. HC IV, supra note 112, annex art. 23(a) (“[I]t is especially forbidden to 
employ poison or poisoned weapons.”); see HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, 
supra note 92, at 251–52; DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 344, § 6.8.1 & n.166; 
UK MANUAL, supra note 3, at 109–19, §§ 6.10–6.19.1; id. at 397, § 15.28; id. at 
427, § 16.27; Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(xvii). 
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but also prohibits the employment of poison; again it is 
prohibited “[t]o employ poison” of any sort in any manner.122 
The customary prohibition of any employment of poison is 
general, all-inclusive, and absolute. The 1863 Lieber Code 
recognized that customary laws of war prohibited “the use of 
poison in any way,”123 even in the face of claims of “military 
necessity,”124 and that “[t]he use of poison in any manner, be it 
to poison wells, or food, or arms, is wholly excluded from modern 
warfare. He that uses it puts himself out of the pale of the law 
and usages of war.”125 The “[p]oisoning of wells” also appears in 
a list of customary war crimes recognized by the Commission on 
the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement 
of Penalties that was presented to the Preliminary Peace 
Conference in Paris following World War I.126 The 1956 United 
States Army Field Manual also recognized that it is a war crime 
to employ poison, including the poisoning of wells or streams.127 
 
 122. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 123. Lieber Code, supra note 93, art. 16. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. art. 70; see also III COMMENTARY, supra note 76, at 421 (“poisoning 
of springs and water sources”); DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 63 (“poisoning of 
drinking water (e.g., wells used by enemy forces) or foodstuffs”); HENCKAERTS 
& DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 92, at 254 (“poisoning the food and drink of the 
adverse party . . . poisoning wells and other water supplies”); DOD MANUAL, 
supra note 1, at 342, § 6.8.1 & nn.166–67 (“poisoning the enemy’s food or water 
supply is prohibited”); UK MANUAL, supra note 3, at 73 n.134 (Geneva Protocol 
I’s recognition that it is unlawful to attack, destroy, remove or render useless 
certain foodstuffs, crops, and drinking water is “wide enough to cover use of 
chemical agents or defoliants against these objects”), § 6.19.1, at 119 (“The 
prohibition applies to any use of poison, including the poisoning or 
contamination of water supplies.”), 427 n.102 (“poisoning of wells, streams, and 
other sources of water supply”); Sir Henry S. Maine, Lecture VII: Mitigation of 
War (1887) (“The poisoning of water or food is a mode of warfare absolutely 
forbidden.”), reprinted in Yale Law Sch., INTERNATIONAL LAW BY HENRY MAINE, 
THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/int07.asp (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2017). 
 126. See 1919 List, supra note 116, at 46 (crime no. 32). 
 127. LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 21, ¶ 37, at 18, ¶ 504(i), at 180 
(listing “poisoning of wells or streams” as a war crime). The 1956 Field Manual 
reflected customary law on this point that had been recognized in a number of 
British texts prohibiting “[t]he contamination of sources of water.” See U.S. 
Dep’t of Army, Pam. 27-161-2, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (1962). For example, 
the 1958 British Manual on The Law of War on Land recognized that “poisoning 
of wells, streams, and other sources of water supply” were examples of war 
crimes. U.K. WAR OFFICE, THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND, BEING PART III OF THE 
MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW ¶ 626(i), at 175 (1958). 
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More generally, it was known by the Founders that 
“poisoners . . . by profession” were international criminals.128 
Because some herbicides are poisonous, the 2015 Manual 
should inform military personnel that poisonous herbicides 
should not be used in warfare. Also, because use of any form of 
poison is prohibited per se, it is incorrect to claim that the 
prohibition applies only to “substances that cause death or 
disability with permanent effects” and “is based on” an 
“uncontrolled character” or “inevitability of death or permanent 
disability.”129 Contrary to these assertions, use of poison of any 
sort for temporary effects, controlled effects, or in any other way 
or manner is prohibited per se.130 
2. Prohibition of the Use of Deleterious or Asphyxiating 
Gases and Chemicals 
Importantly, “[u]se of deleterious and asphyxiating gases” 
also appears in the list of customary war crimes recognized by 
the 1919 Paris Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of 
the War and on Enforcement of Penalties.131 Therefore, prior to 
the adoption of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, use of “deleterious and 
asphyxiating gases” as well as poison in any form had been 
recognized as per se violations of the customary laws of war. An 
important issue, therefore, is whether the use of particular 
herbicides or other chemicals in spray form or gas is 
“deleterious” or “asphyxiating” even if the use of other herbicides 
would not reach these customary legal triggers. Further, the 
customary prohibitions shed light on the meaning of certain 
phrases in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. When the drafters of the 
1925 Protocol affirmed that “use in war of asphyxiating, 
poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials 
or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of 
the civilized world,”132 the drafters recognized and affirmed what 
we would term a pattern of general opinio juris that recognizably 
 
 128. See, e.g., 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 509, 515 (1821) (quoting EMMERICH DE 
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1758)); PAUST, supra note 17, at 12, 434 n.54. 
 129. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 344, § 6.8.1. 
 130. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. Moreover, temporary 
or controlled poisoning can also run afoul of the customary prohibition of 
causing unnecessary suffering. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 131. See 1919 List, supra note 116, at 46 (crime no. 26). 
 132. See 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 
1925, 26 U.S.T. 571., 94 L.N.T.S. 65. 
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condemned their use. Importantly, the language set forth in the 
1925 Protocol recognizably reflects customary international 
law.133 
3. Additional Concerns Regarding Use of Herbicides in War 
In 1945, the Judge Advocate General of the United States 
Army recognized the potential reach of the customary 
prohibition of poison to gases and “crop-destroying chemicals 
which can be sprayed by airplane”134 and recognized that “a 
customary rule of international law has developed by which 
poisonous gases and those causing unnecessary suffering are 
prohibited,” which include “poisonous and deleterious gases”; 
that customary law requires that “chemicals do not produce 
poisonous effects upon enemy personnel, either from direct 
contact, or indirectly from ingestion of plants and vegetables 
which have been exposed thereto”; and that “[w]hether . . . 
agents . . . are toxic . . . is a question of fact which should be 
definitely ascertained.”135 The 2015 Manual misreads the Judge 
Advocate General’s memorandum as if it supports a new and 
unaccepted limitation of the prohibition of asphyxiating, 
poisonous, or other gases to those “that are designed to kill or 
injure human beings,136 a supposed test that is also inconsistent 
with the customary prohibitions of (1) employment of weapons 
or material of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering,137 (2) 
employment of indiscriminate methods or means of combat,138 
 
 133. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 345, § 6.8.2 & nn.175–76; Rome 
Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(xviii). 
 134. See Memorandum from Major General Myron C. Cramer for the 
Secretary of War on Destruction of Crops by Chemicals (Mar. 1945), reprinted 
in 10 I.L.M. 1304 (1971). 
 135. See id. at 1305–06 (emphasis added). 
 136. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 345, § 6.8.2 & n.177 (emphasis 
added). 
 137. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 138. See, e.g., Geneva Protocol I, supra note 98, art. 51(4)(c) (indiscriminate 
measures include “those which employ a method or means of combat the effects 
of which cannot be limited . . . and consequently . . . are of a nature to strike 
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction”); 
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 92, at 40; UK MANUAL, supra note 
3, at 68, §§ 5.23 & 5.23.1; see also DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 244, § 5.12 
(quoting Geneva Protocol I regarding “excessive” loss of life or injury to 
civilians). 
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and (3) the infliction of suffering or injury unnecessary to 
accomplish a legitimate military purpose.139 
4. Poisoning or Destruction of Food, Crops, or Water 
The 1956 U.S. Army Field Manual affirms that use of poison 
is unlawful, but it states that efforts “to destroy, through 
chemical or bacterial agents harmless to man, crops intended 
solely for consumption by the armed forces (if that fact can be 
determined)” would be permissible.140 Therefore, the 1956 Field 
Manual makes clear (1) that the chemicals or bacterial agents 
used must not be “poison,” (2) that they must be “harmless to 
man,” (3) that the crops must be “solely for consumption” by the 
enemy military,141 and (4) that it must be “determined” that the 
 
 139. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 140. LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 21, ¶ 37, at 18. 
 141. Id.; see also Gerald J. Adler, Targets in War: Legal Considerations, 8 
HOUS. L. REV. 1 (1970), reprinted in 3 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 281, 317, 319 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1972); Denise Bindschedler-Robert, A 
Reconsideration of the Law of Armed Conflicts, in THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS GENEVA: 15–20 SEPTEMBER 1969, at 37 
(Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace 1971) (“the destruction of crops can only 
be justified if it is definitely established that they are destined for the enemy 
army alone”); MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS 338–39 (1982); A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 44 (1996) 
(it is correct that targeting “food facilities not being military objectives unless 
used exclusively by the armed forces or in direct support of military action” 
would be proscribed). 
Geneva Protocol I focuses on a different and limited aspect. See Geneva Protocol 
I, supra note 98, art. 54(2) (“It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render 
useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as 
food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, 
drinking water installations and supplies . . . for the specific purpose of denying 
them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse 
Party . . . .”), (3)(a) (the prohibition “shall not apply to such of the objects 
covered . . . as are used by an adverse Party: (a) as sustenance solely for the 
members of its armed forces”). The DOD Manual assumes that this limited focus 
was meant to be exclusive as if the only prohibition must involve an intent to 
deny sustenance value. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 293, § 5.20.4 & 
n.620. A supposed example is “destroying a field of crops to prevent it from being 
used as concealment by the enemy.” Id. First, destroying a field of crops before 
it is being misused by an enemy would not be necessary and would be a violation 
if the field of crops was not destined for consumption solely by enemy military. 
Second, once the enemy misuses a field of crops to hide their advance, like 
misuse of a Red Cross vehicle or human shields, the enemy can be attacked and 
loss of the crops would be their crime. Third, it would seem unlikely that it could 
be “determined” that an entire field was destined for consumption “solely” by 
enemy military. But see id. at 292 nn.612–613, quoting a 1971 letter from a 
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crops are solely for military consumption.142 Clearly, crops that 
cannot be identified as those to be used solely for consumption 
by the enemy military must not be targeted. Therefore, crops 
that could be used by enemy military as well as noncombatants 
cannot be targeted under any circumstances. Whether or not all 
herbicides are illegal per se, the destruction or poisoning of food, 
crops, or water that noncombatants might use would be 
indiscriminate143 and prohibited per se. It would not matter what 
weapon or tactic produced that result. 
H. JUSTIFIED USE OF FORCE IN KOSOVO 
The 2015 Manual addresses use of military force in Kosovo 
and declares that the United States did not adopt humanitarian 
intervention “as a legal rationale for NATO’s military action to 
address the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo in 1999, but 
rather expressed its view that such action was justified on the 
basis of a number factors.”144 Humanitarian intervention was a 
 
DOD General Counsel alleging that crops not intended solely for consumption 
by civilians could be intentionally destroyed. This attempt to reverse the 
customary test recognized in the Department of the Army Field Manual, Law 
of Land Warfare, is unacceptable and use of such a test would result in conduct 
that is indiscriminate, “the effects of which cannot be limited,” and would be “of 
a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction,” within the meaning of Geneva Protocol I, Article 54. 
 142. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. In a given circumstance, 
their destruction might also violate the precautions obligation. As explained by 
Professor Geoffrey Corn, while raising a concern with respect to the Manual’s 
treatment of the precautions obligation, it is an “obligation to take all feasible 
precautions,” “a requirement to take ‘constant care’ to mitigate the risk to 
civilians and civilian property . . . to reduce risk to civilians.” See Geoffrey S. 
Corn, Precautions to Minimize Civilian Harm are a Fundamental Principle of 
the Law of War, JUST SECURITY (Jul. 8, 2015), http://www.justsecurity.org/
24493/obligation-precautions-fundamental-principle-law-war; cf Charles J. 
Dunlap, Jr., Let’s Balance the Argument About the DOD Law of War Manual 
and Targeting, JUST SECURITY (Jul. 10, 2015), http://www.justsecurity.org/
24542/lets-balance-argument-dod-law-war-manual-targeting ((noting that 
Geneva Protocol I, art. 57(3), limits application to “[w]hen a choice is possible,” 
which had been a limit that the U.S. had stressed). The intentional targeting of 
a truck assumed to be carrying merely food and water to a town in which there 
are many enemy soldiers and a great deal more civilians, including children, 
would be a choice that violates the precautions obligation as well as the 
prohibitions of indiscriminate targeting and unnecessary death, injury, or 
suffering (see supra note 138). It would certainly violate the test set forth in the 
1956 Field Manual. 
 144. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 46, § 1.11.4.4 & n.221. 
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claim set forth by the United Kingdom.145 Although some 
considered the action in Kosovo to be unlawful,146 NATO’s 
authorization of the use of force exemplified regional peace and 
security action permitted as “regional action” under Article 52 of 
the United Nations Charter when the Security Council is veto-
deadlocked or otherwise has made no decision limiting 
permissible regional action.147 
I. SELF-DEFENSE: THE WRONG TEST 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter expressly limits the 
inherent right of self-defense to a circumstance when “an armed 
attack occurs.”148 However, the 2015 Manual claims that the 
“inherent right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 . . . , may 
be triggered by . . . an armed attack or imminent threat 
thereof.”149 As noted in another writing, an “imminent threat 
logically and by definition is not even a present threat and use 
of such a remarkably expansive criterion as a trigger for 
permissible use of force in self-defense would be legal 
nonsense.”150 The phrase is not the same as “threat of imminent 
armed attack,” which would be consistent with a minority view 
that anticipatory self-defense should be permissible even though 
an armed attack is not occurring.151 Indeed, “a claim to use force 
in self-defense before a threat even materializes would be more 
dangerous and manifestly unacceptable than a claim to use 
preemptive self-defense” against an alleged threat.152 
 
 145. See id. at 45-46 & n.220. 
 146. See, e.g., PAUST ET. AL, supra note 15, at 1093. 
 147. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 52 (“Nothing in the present Charter 
precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with 
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as 
are appropriate for regional action”); Jordan J. Paust, Use of Military Force in 
Syria by Turkey, NATO, and the United States, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 437–
40 (2013). 
 148. See U.N. Charter art. 51; Jordan J. Paust, Armed Attacks and 
Imputation: Would a Nuclear Weaponized Iran Trigger Permissible Israeli and 
U.S. Measures of Self-Defense?, 45 GT. J. INT’L L. 411, 414-15 (2014) (also 
addressing when an armed attack is underway, id. at 437–40). 
 149. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 999–1,000, § 16.3.3. 
 150. Paust, supra note 148, at 419. 
 151. See id. at 41–17, 420. 
 152. See id. at 420–21. Use of force in preemptive self-defense would be a 
manifest violation of the U.N. Charter that can constitute the crime of 
aggression. See id. at 420 n.12. 
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The Manual also declares that “the United States has 
expressed the view that when warranted, it will respond to 
hostile acts . . . as it would to any other threat to the country.”153 
Of course, a real “threat” or “hostile act” might not constitute an 
armed attack that would warrant a lawful response in self-
defense.154 
J. THERE CANNOT BE A TRANSNATIONAL NIAC 
The DOD Manual declares that “States warring against 
non-State armed groups may be described as ‘non-international 
armed conflict,’ even if international borders are crossed in the 
fighting.”155 As recognized in a recent study,156 however, 
The text of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions contains two significant phrases that stand 
in sharp opposition to a postulated space for an alleged 
cross-border or transnational NIAC. First, the phrase 
“not of an international character” clearly directs 
attention to the character of the armed conflict and to 
awareness of real world context. Cross-border and 
transnational features of an armed conflict are 
internationalizing features of context that necessarily 
make the armed conflict one that is international in 
character. Second, common Article 3 declares that an 
armed conflict not of an international character is an 
armed conflict that is “occurring in the territory of one of 
the” State parties.157 Necessarily, a cross-border or 
 
 153. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1000, § 16.3.3 (emphasis added). 
 154. See also id. n.28 (quoting President Obama: “‘certain hostile acts’” “‘as 
appropriate and consistent with international law’”). 
 155. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, at 74, § 3.3.1, 1010, § 17.1 (claiming that 
NIACs are those “that are not between states”). But see id. at 1011, § 17.1.1.1 
(rightly noting that when the non-state enemy is a “belligerent . . . the law of 
international armed conflict would be applied.”). 
 156. See Jordan J. Paust, NIAC Nonsense, the Afghan War, and Combatant 
Immunity, 44 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. NO. 2 (Forthcoming, 2016). The article 
also addresses proper tests for pow and combatant status based on membership 
– tests that are important to retain for members of armed forces. 
 157. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War of August 12, 1949, supra note 34, art. 3 (emphasis added). In a 
related manner, a 1977 Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions that is 
applicable during an Article 3 conflict declares that it applies to “armed 
conflicts. . . which take place in the territory of a” State party “between its 
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups.” 
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transnational armed conflict will not occur within one 
country. As the authoritative commentary of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) clearly 
reminds, “the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed 
conflicts . . . [that] take place within the confines of a 
single country.”158 
 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
art. 1(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (1977). See also Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 
8(2)(f) (armed conflicts not of an international character are “conflicts that take 
place in the territory of a State . . . between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups”). 
 158. See, e.g., IV COMMENTARY, supra note 76, at 36; III COMMENTARY, 
supra note 76, at 37 (same language); see also The Prosecutor v. Musema, Case 
No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 247 (Jan. 27,2000) (during an 
NIAC, the “government of a single State [is] in conflict with one or more factions 
within its territory”), ¶ 248 (“non-international armed conflicts are situations 
in which hostilities break out between armed forces or organized armed groups 
within the territory of a single State”); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 
1506, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (common Article 3 “applies to . . . internal or civil 
wars of a purely domestic nature . . . Accordingly, Article 3 does not apply to the 
United States’ invasion of Panama.”); CORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 85–86 
(common Article 3 includes “the qualification that the armed conflict occur 
‘within the territory of one’” State party, “[a]s a result . . . [an Article 3 conflict 
or insurgency] was indeed synonymous with internal” conflict, and the ICRC 
interpretation has been that there are two types of armed conflict under Geneva 
law: “[1] international armed conflict (when the operations are conducted 
outside the territory of the state) or [2] non-international armed conflict (limited 
to operations conducted within the territory of the state).”); IV COMMENTARY, 
supra note 76, at 14 (“international conflicts” are in contradistinction to “an 
armed conflict which is not international in character”); Robert Weston Ash, 
Square Pegs and Round Holes: Al-Qaeda Detainees and Common Article 3, 17 
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 269, 298–99 (2007) (an armed conflict is an Article 
3 insurgency only if the conflict occurs within a single state); cf. DOD MANUAL, 
supra note 1, at 1011, § 17.1.1.2 (recognizing “a traditional definition of non-
international armed conflict as only those armed conflicts occurring within the 
borders of a single State,” quoting IV COMMENTARY, supra note 76, at 36). But 
see COMMENTARY OF 2016 ON THE CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD, 
GENEVA, 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶¶ 79–73 (ICRC 2016), https://www.icrc.org/applic/
IHL/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&document1d. This new 
Commentary correctly notes that proper application of common Article 2 rests 
upon “the pre-eminence of the factual existence of an armed conflict . . . [which] 
must be based solely on the prevailing facts.” Id. ¶ 20. It also notes that “[a] 
determination based on the prevailing facts should also conform to . . . the strict 
separation of jus in bello from jus ad bellum” so that “determination of the 
existence of an armed conflict and the related applicability of international 
humanitarian law depend only on the circumstances prevailing on the ground.” 
Id. ¶ 24. In sharp contrast, however, the new Commentary would hinge the 
nature of a cross-border conflict as an armed conflict of an international 
character on lack of “consent” of a territorial state to outside intervention, which 
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Also addressed in the article are various internationalizing 
features of context (such as direct participation in combat by 
armed forces of other states) that should be taken into account 
when making a realistic and policy-serving decision whether an 
armed conflict is of an international character.159 For U.S. 
military personnel, it is critically important from 
a policy-serving standpoint that whenever U.S. military 
personnel engage in fighting during hostilities abroad 
the U.S. Government should recognize that such direct 
U.S. participation in hostilities has internationalized the 
armed conflict if it had not previously been an armed 
conflict of an international character so that U.S. 
military personnel will have combatant status and 
combatant immunity for lawful acts of war. Otherwise, 
U.S. soldiers could be prosecuted under relevant 
 
is what some writers prefer to consider regarding jus ad bellum or use of force 
(often in error). See id. n.98. According to the new Commentary, if a state 
consents “to the use of force in its own territory by a foreign State” the armed 
conflict will allegedly not be of an international character. See id. ¶¶ 69, 73. But 
if the state does not consent “it would amount to an international armed 
conflict.” See id. ¶ 70. And, if “cross-border or spillover” hostilities occur in the 
territory of a non-consenting State, “that intervention constitutes an 
unconsented to intrusion into the territorial State’s sphere of sovereignty . . . 
amounting to an international armed conflict.” Id. ¶ 71 (adding that this “was 
implicitly affirmed by the ICJ). Further, if the foreign state attacks non-state 
actors and the attacks “concomitantly affect the local population and the 
[territorial] State’s infrastructure . . . it better corresponds to the factual reality 
to conclude that an international armed conflict arises . . . when force is used” 
without consent of the territorial state. See id. § 72. Therefore, the ICRC 
recognizes that some cross-border violence will change the character of an 
armed conflict to one of an international nature. However, to rest classification 
of the character of a conflict on state “consent” is contrary to the ICRC’s own 
admonition regarding the distinction between law of war and use of force 
criteria and the recognized need to focus on the facts when making a choice 
about the existence and character of armed conflicts to which humanitarian law 
applies. Further, to limit the full reach of humanitarian law because of the 
happenstance of state “consent” is contrary to general efforts to provide greater 
protection for human beings during armed conflict. It is also dangerous with 
respect to soldiers who would have combatant status and combatant immunity 
for lawful acts of war when the conflict is of an international character, for 
example, whenever a cross-border conflict occurs without consent. Subsequent 
“consent” would make soldiers murderers when they lawfully kill enemy 
fighters during what has supposedly become a NIAC even though the fighting 
and facts “on the ground” are the same. With respect to the multi-state and 
transborder war against ISIS, consent by Iraq would supposedly make the war 
against ISIS in Iraq a NIAC, but lack of consent would supposedly make the 
same war against ISIS in Syria an IAC. 
 159. See Paust, supra note 156. 
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domestic law for murder or other domestic crimes for 
what would have been privileged acts of war during an 
international armed conflict.160 
Conclusion 
This Article has documented several errors and manifest 
misconceptions that are contained in the 2015 DOD Law of War 
Manual. The Manual should be revised161 to eliminate the errors 
and provide proper guidance and protection for U.S. military 
personnel and others who might use the Manual. Manifestly 
misstating the content and reach of law will not serve or protect 
those users. 
 
 160. Paust, supra note 97, at 170 (citing PAUST ET AL., supra note 3, at 685–
86, 697–98); Lewis, supra note 110, at 309 & n.96. 
 161. The Manual states that comments and suggestions are invited. DOD 
MANUAL, supra note 1, at vi. Therefore, presumably it will be revised 
periodically. 
